What kind of undcrdevclopment is meant hcre? Glen Williams (1983) suggests that one criterion to use in measuring devclopment is the degree to which exports are manufactured goods rather than raw materials. It is clear that, while Canada has a large surplus of trade in raw rnatcrials, it is heavily dependent on importing manufactured goods. Williams (1983:8) points out hat, leaving aside the Auto Pact Canada's pcrccntage of finished goods as a proponion of total exports was only 22% in 1980 --compared to 71% for Japan, 60% for West Germany and 52% for the U.S.
Countries usually regardcd as developing or semi-industrial, such as India or Brazil, show an export rccord as good as Canada's (23% and 22% respectively). By this one criterion, thcn. Canada seems to fall well below the nadons with which it prefers to associate. However, as Williams observes, thcrc are many other criteria considered rclcvant as measures of dcvclopment such as thc dcgrce of integration in thc cconomy, the gap bctwecn productivity and wages, and investment levcls. Hc concludes that thc Canadian cconomy is not undcrdevclopcd in thc way that pcriphcral economies are, although Canada docs suffcr from a case of arrestcd industrialization due to the undcrdcvclopmcnt of domestic manufacturing industries. Thc causes and conscqucnccs of this situation are complcx but ccntral to any discussion of it arc the scrious tradc imbalances for Canada, thc havy rcliancc on forcign capilal to invest in Can~dian industries and wcak cxpon markcts for Canadian-manufactur products. These conscqucnces arc intcr-rclatcd, as is thc vcxcd qucslion of forcign owncrship in thc Canadian economy.
Wallacc Clcmcnt (1983: ch.2) states that the most significant sectors of the economy arc foreign-conuolled through owncrship and invcstmcnt, wih only a few remaining prcdominantly controlled by Canadians: finance, transport, utilities and fhe mass mcdia. Tcchnological lcadcrship by U.S. corporations has also playcd its part in this process of forcign conlrol, according to Clcment (1983:88). Thc attitudc of the state towards forcign investment and forcign control in the economy has bcen somewhat ambivalcnt. On the onc hand, it is firmly bclicvcd at thc fcdcral lcvel (and cvcn more emphatically by many provincial govcrnmcnts) that foreign investment is csscntial for Canadian prosperity. One thc othcr hand, "too much" forcign ownership --although obscrvcrs cannot agrce on what level that would be --is thought to be dctrimcncal to Canadian sovcrcignty. Also, somc sectors of the cconomy arc seen to be morc crucial for sovcrcignty than others. For cxarnple, the communications sector (mass mcdia and tclccornmunications) has been sccn by thc fcdcral govcrnmcnt in this light whcrcas consumer goods manufacturing has not received Lhe same attcntion. The satcllitc industry is a particular case in point of a strategically important industry, One that involves the dcsign and manufacture of high technology goods --and also one thought to have export potential. It is useful to realize that federal policy priorities relatcd to cconomic sovcrcignty, support for high technology research and dcvclopment activities, asidc from efforts to improve broadcasting service covcWS havc bccn influential in thc dcvclopment of satellite policy in Canada.
Somc of those who usc the political economy approach regard Harold Innis as thc major scholx to have influenced thcir work. In particular, Innis' The Bias of ~~mrnunication and Empire and Communications have providcd the basis for a plitical cconorny analysis of Canadian communications systems (Innis, 1951 (Innis, ,1972 An apprcciadon of thc importance of tcrnporal and spatial problcms of cxccss capacity as dctcrminants of problcrns of "rigidity" and "bias";
An acknowlcdgcmcnt of thc cxtcnt to which such "rigididcs" and possibilities of joint production opcratcd to undcrminc the cffcctivcncss of the price systcm and rclatcd allowlivc rncchanisms;
An awarcncss of thc ways in which monoplics of forcc and monopolics of knowlcdgc h2vc historically ariscn in rclation to thc cxistcncc of such biascs; A sensitivity to thc potential for politico-cconomic centralization and deccnualization incidcnLal to the adoption and utilization olpanicular mcans of communication.
The timc or spacc "bias" of particular mcdia was an esscndal fcature of much of h i s ' work on communications. Thc space bias of satcllitcs is cvidcnt, literally and sl.mcturally. In pmicular, h c cconomic rigiditics inhcrent in such biases can bc rcadily illustrated with rcfcrcncc to satcllitc communications. The Irugc-scale cxpcnditurcs nc&d to esfablish a satcllitc system preclude dcccntnlizcd control of the technology and create many opportunities for control by h c ccntrc over the pcriphcry. Thcrc has also bccn the problcm of excess capacity in the monopoly scllcr of satcllitc channcls ( T c h t Canada) and his h s led to biascs and rigiditics in a markctplacc whcrc price-setting cannot bc vicwcd as olhcr than arbitrary.
Whilc it is acccptcd that all h e analytical tools and thcir associatcd conccpls arc lntcr-rclatcd in Innis' work, h c following discussion conccnmtcs on the conccpt of ' m o n~~o h c s of knowlcdgc" and how this can bc used to undcrsland somc of thc Significant fcaturcs of Canadian satcllitc broadcasting. In discussing the rnonopolics Or bnowl~dg~, Innis diffcrcntiatcd bctwccn thc oral mdition and rnodcrn systcms of communication in tcms of the possibilities for monopolization. In his view, oral communication was essentially a decentralized. open system whereas mechanical systcms allowed for the development of a class of dominant persons who could own and control them, usually to the detriment of the interests of other pcople in the society.
In particular, Innis took exception to the ideology of freedom of the press because he thought it was contradicted by the economic opportunities for press control afforded to ncwspaper publishers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Innis, 1951: 186) .
Jamcs Carey (1975: 40) has put forward the view that the Innisian concept of monopolies of knowledge has thrce dimensions: physical, structural and cultural. In the physical dirncnsion, the monopoly is controlled by whoever holds the crucial position in the technical system; there may be more than one such position. There is also thc structural dimension which can be controlled firstly by those whose financial support is essential to the opcrution of the system and secondly by those (not necessarily the same pcople) who have the technical expertise needed t operate the syslcm. Finally, there is the cultural dimension that can be controlled by those who decide what kinds of communication contcnt will be carried through the system. Such cultural domination is especially relevant to the analysis of mass communications systems. Through cultural control, it is argued by Innis and others. the opportunity cxists for dcfining what the dominant version of "reality" is in any particular society. In this papcr, we will review in turn the thrce dimensions of the monopolies. This analysis argues that the structural dimension is far more complex and restrictive than the physical dimension of control apparcnlly afforded Tclesat Canada. Finally, the cultural dirncnsion of the monopoly of knowledge is rcgardcd as exlremely important and most problematic in the social context of northern Canada and the native communities that exist thcre.
The Physical Dimension
Bcforc analyzing the physical dimension, it is necessary t outline the evolution of the Canadian satellite industry. The definition of the industry can mean simply the satcllite communications corporation (Telesat Canada) that has been given by federal statute a service monopoly throughout the counuy. Alternatively, it can refer to the manufacturing industry that is involvcd in, among olhcr activities, the design and production of satcllite cnli and earth-based monitoring, transmission and reception equipmcnt. This industry is also referred to as the acrospace industry. It depends hcavily on government contracts and, to a lesser extent, on private sector production ordcrs to survive. Telesat is a significant buyer of satcllite equipment and spacecraft from this industry. Involvement in space activities by private industry and government laboratories in Canada goes back at least to the late 1950s. By 1963, the Canadian Ionospheric Research program was approved for funding by the federal government, with the implicit assumption that related research and development would be performed by Canadian industry. Ionosphcric research via satellite began in 1959 with thc Canada-Unites Slates joint project that produced the Alouette and Isis series of $ientific satellitcs. This highly successful series was followed by research on satellitcs.
In 1964, Canada was a founding mcmbcr of Intclsat, thc opcrator of the global communications satellite system Lhal now scrves most countrics in the world. In early 1967, a study published undcr the auspiccs of the Scicnce Secretariat of thc Canadian gave strong support to the dcvelopmcnt of spacc technology in Canada a central thcmc in Canada's space program (Chapman, 1967: 109) :
Application of space technology to specific Canadian nccds should be the central theme of the program. Canada needs satcllitcs for TV and telephone scrviccs to thc north. for augmenting communications east and west, for surveying natural resources, for surveillance of weather, spotting forest fircs and ice in shipping lanes and for many other purposes. The prime objective for space technology in Canada is its application to tclccommunications and survey problems of a large sparscly settled country.
In July 1%7, a rcport was issucd by the Scicncc Council of Canada that endorsed, as the Secretariat study had donc. Lhc compctcncc of Canadian industry to undcrtakc thc design and manufacture of the hardware for a dorncstic satellite system. By thc end of 1967, thc Pcarson govcrnmcnt had dccidcd to usc satcllitcs to expand thc dorncstic communications networks. Then, in March, 1968, thc Ministcr of Industry issucd a White Paper on "A Domestic Satcllitc Communication Systcm for Canada" and this was used as the basis for the Tclcsat Canada Act. approvcd by Parliamcnl in 1969.
According to the Whitc Papa (Minister of Industry, 1968:32) a domestic satclli~ systcm could have significant bcncfits for thc distribution of tclcvision scrvicc in Canada. First, it could make TV scrviccs available in both English and Frcnch across the country, which had not been possible to date. Second, it should do this at a lower cost and sooner than would be possible through expansion of existing tcrrcsuial distribution systcms. Third. it would allow the extcnsion of tclcvision scrviccs to many areas of the country prcviously unscrved because of thcir rcmotcness from thc main centres of population and from the U.S. border. Tclcsat Canada was established by statute in 1969 wi~h an cxclusive mandate to own and operate all communications satelk systcms in Canada. Its mandate appcarcd to include the ownership of all satellite receiving equipment (i.c., earth stations, also known as dishes) but this exclusivity was strongly challenged within a few years.
Under section 5 of its statute, Ihc corporate objectives of Tclesat arc to "establish satellite communications systems providing, on a commercial basis, telecommunications services between locations in Canada". Also. Telcsat is directed to:
utilize, to the extent practicable and consistent with its commercial nature, Canadian research, design, and industrial personnel, tcchnology and facilitics in research and devclopment connected with its satellite telecommunications systems and in the design and construction of the systems.
It was expected that the Government of Canada. the major common carriers and private shareholders would each have about one-third ownership in Telesat. However, the shares for gencnl issue have never been put on the market. By 1972, the federal government and the common carriers had provided thirty million dollars as the share capital of the company.
Tclesat's fist satellite, Anik A-1, was launched in late 1972 and put into service in early 1973. The A series of three satellites was built by Hughes Aircraft, an American company. In April 1974, the fist official statement of government space policy was issued by the Minister of State for Science and Technology. Some of the main points (summarized in Department of Communications, 1980: 17) were:
Govcrnmcnt purchasing policies should encourage the establishment of a viable research, development and manufacturing capability in Canadian industry ....
Dcpartmcnts involved should submit plans to ensure that, to the fullest extent possible. Canada's sadlite systems are designed. devclopcd and construcled in Canada. by Canadians, using Canadian components ....
Canada's primary intcrcst in space should be to use it for applications that conlributc directly to thc achicvcmcnt of national goals.
It was cvidcnt from this policy that hcavy emphasis was to be placed on private industry participation in r c m h and development of satellite systems. In May 1979, a significant stcp forward was made when Telcsat Canada signed a contract with Spar Aerospace to act as prime contractor on the production of two satellites in the Anik D series. In October 1986. Telcsat awardcd the construction contract for two Anik E dual-band satellites also lo Spar.
While Telesat has the cxclusive Canadian mandate to own and operate commercial communications satellitcs, the federal government is involved in many different types of satellite usage, mainly experimental and scientific. The Department of Communications (DOC) has been heavily involvcd in experimental communications satellites but other dcpartmcnts such as National Defence and Energy, Mines and Resources have been interested in remote-sensing satellites. The government's collcctive cfforts have been mainly coordinated through the Interdepartmental Committee on Space (ICS), set up on 1969. In 1976, the Communications Technology Satellite (CTS) was launched as a joint endeavour of the DOC, NASA in the U.S. and the European Space Agency. According to thc DOC'S Annual Report 1975-76, one of the main objectives of the satellite was "to demonstrate high-power television and other transmission to small, low-cost earth stations". Expcriments using the satellite (later re-named Hermes) began in April 1976 and continued until June 1979. The DOC was responsible for the operation of the satellite and the management of the more than twenty "social" experiments carried out. The social experiments were mostly projects to use satellite communications for the improvement of educational or hcalth scrviccs in remote areas. Experiments to improve intcr-community communications links were also conducted by several native organizations, including the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada.
(All of these experiments should be differentiated from the technical experiments testing the use of Hcrmes, and its successor Anik B, for dircct-to-home television disuibution.)
The DOC was also involved in the planning and dcsign of the fist dual-band satellite, Anik B, which was owncd and opcratcd by Telesat. A k r the Anik B launch in December 1979, about seventeen "pilot projccts" that had developcd fmm the Herrnes experiments wcre allowed to use the higher frequency channels on Anik B (in the 13/12 GHz range); DOC leased these channels from Tclcsat for two years at a cost of $34 million. All the non-commercial expcriments and projects on both satcllitcs benefitted from having free satellite time and the provision of earth stations and other equipment from the DOC. However, this assistance could not be provided indefinitely and the experimentation came to an end in fall 1982. It had been hoped that the experimenlers would transfer their activities to Telesat's Anik C cornmcrcial operations but the cost of channel lcasing was too high for most of them.
If we look now at the physical dimension of the monopolies of knowledge, the most striking fmture is the hwvy involvement of the federal govcrnmcnt in funding and encouraging the scientific and technical development of salcllitc technology in Canada. Without the federal government's major cxpcnditurcs on satellite research and development, it is unlikely that the Canadian private sector would have dcvclopcd a significant presence in the aerospace industries of the world. Thc fcdcral govcrnmcnt priorities in establishing an acmspace industry, and in enhancing the rcscarch and development basis for high technology industries gcncrally, wcre strong influences in the evolution of the satellite industry in particular.
With regard to thc formation of Telesat Canada. this was also a federal initiative, one which detcrmincd that there would be only one corporation that could own and operate a satcllite system in Canada. However, it is worth noting that, while Tclesat Canada has been legally established as the monopoly seller of satellite-fed communications services in Canada, here are several significant limitations to this. First, it is not a monopoly seller of tclccommunications services in Canada or anywhere else. Canada has extensive terrestrial telecommunications networks (mostly owncd and operated by the telephone companies) and these can almost always provide a physical alternative to satellite carriage. In many instances, they are alsoeconomically more attractive to buyers of telecommunications services than the satellite alternative.
Second, Telesat Canada docs not have exclusive access to Canadian territory from space since virtually all American domestic satellite signals can be rcceivcd in Canada as well as the U.S. The physical reach of Canadian and American satellite scrviccs Political Economy Cdn. Satellite Broadcasting/J. McNulty has had effects on the monopoly legislated for Tclcsat; the effects work in two directions. One consequence is that Telesat has been able to sell satellite services to American customers when there is insufficient American satellite capacity to accommodate servicc demand; however, this market is not reliable for Telesat and can appear and disappear abruptly depending on American satellite launchings and public policy. The second cffcct of the satellite systems' rcach is the tendency for Canadians to reccivc American broadcasting-type services from American satellites and, thus, undcrmine the Canadian scrvicc monopoly supposedly belonging to Telesat. In political terms, it is not always possible for Telcsat or the Minister of Communications to enforcc this monopoly.
The Structural Dimension
This dimension of the monopolies of knowledge contains a number of aspects that arc significant to understanding Canadian satellite broadcasting. First. there is the naturc of Tclesat Canada's owncrship structure and its cffccts. The limitation on who can be sharcholdcrs'has mcant that the major influences on the corporation's operations have inevitably come from thc fcdcml government (50%), Bcll Canada (about 25%). othcr telephone companics (16%) and other carriers (9%) such as CNCP Telccornmunications, through the parent railway companies. As already discussed, thc federal government's attitude towards Tclcsat has been mainly an interest in promoting a high technology industrial strategy. At the same time, the fedcral govcrnmcnt also wants to sce thc satellite systcm used for social bencfit, especially with regard to the extcnsion of broadcasting services. Thcre is also a recognition among somc policy-makers that satellite-fed broadcasting services to the north should bc adapted to thc cultural necds of the native pcople in the northern territories (the needs of native pcoplc living in the provinces, cspccially in southern areas, havc not been so prornincnt). To a considerable extent, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) is expccted to provide culturally-appropriale broadcasting services in the north but no spccial funding has been provided by Parliament for program production to mect this purpose.
Rcgarding scrvice coverage, however, since the start of Tclesat operations the CBC has been provided with special public funding to lease several satellite channels. Thcse channels are used to feed the English and French network services, and the Parliamentary channcl across the country; northern services in radio and television are also distributed in this way. As well as leasing satellite channels. the CBC was provided with spccial Parliamentary funds in the mid-1970s under what was called the Accelerated Coverage Plan (ACP). The Plan was to extend the local distribution of CBC radio and television service to unserved communities of 500 people or more. Eventually, in the north, the community size to qualify for local distribution of CBC signals was rcduced to 200people. As already observed, none of this extension activity included funds for new programming appropriate to the increasingly northern reach of broadcasting services. The cultural dimensions of this arrangement were, and remain, the basis of much criticism from native people living in the north.
The other half of the owncrship of Telesat has rested in the hands of the major telecommunications carriers and, it could be argued, their influence on the day-to-day commercial operations of Telesat has been significantly greater ban hat of the federal government. The principal telephone companies are members of an unincorporated association known as Telecom Canada (formerly called the Tnns Canada Telephone System or TCTS). These same companies arc most of the telecommunications carriers permitted to own Telesat shares. as well as bcing the main customers for Telesat channels in its early years. In order to secure some predictable share of the Canadian telecommunications carriage markct, Telesat became a mcmber of Telecom in 1976, with the permission of the fedcnl Cabinet Some indication of thc relative economic strcngth of Telesat and Tclccom can be seen in the market shares and opcrating revenues they enjoy. In 1982, Telcsat had a 0.7% share of the Canadian telecommunications markct comparcd to a share of 51.9% for Bell Canada and a told share of 86.9% for all the Tclecom members excluding Telesat (Dcpartmcnt of Communications, 1983). In 1985. Telcsat's operating revenues were $101 million while Bell Canada's revenues for 1985 were $5.76 billion. The major concern of the Telecom membcrs has bccn the need to ensure that Telcsat did not provide scrviccs competitive with those already providcd by the telephone companies. Until recently, Telesat accepted the intcrpremtion of its mandate hat it was to be a "carrier's carrier" and not an independent carrier in its own right
The close connection between Tclcsat and Telccom that began in 1976 has been changed considerably by amcndmcnts to the connecting agreement approved by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) in May 1986. There is now the possibility that Telesat will compete against the telephone companies in the provision of some services. Part of the reason for this shift in control may be due to the shift towards reliance on bmadcast services as the main source of Telesat's revenues. In its 1985 Annual Report, Telesat showed that 45.8% of revenues came from domestic broadcast services while 41.4% came from voicc/datdimage services.
The operation of Canadian Satellite Communications Inc. (Cancom) is also relevant to a discussion of the structural monopolies at work in satellite broadcasting. After a series of complex public hearings, in Decision 81-252. the CRTC licensed Cancom, a private company, to provide certain Canadian radio and television signals b communities then underserved or remote from conventional broadcasting services. Cancom's licensed operations depend wholly on satellite delivery of the signals to local redistribution systems (either cabled or over-air) acmss the'counlry. As such, Cancom must deal with the monopoly seller of satellite channels. Telesat Cancom itself has a structural monopoly regarding the legal provision of distant broadcast signals to specific communities designated by the CRTC as Cancom's "core market" --that is, those communities receiving two or 'less television signals by conventional means. Since 1981. the CRTC has not licensed any other company to provide a sadlite-fed service like that of Cancom. In 1983, in Decision 83-126, the CRTC authorized Cancom to make available to its customers a selection of American TV signals representing the three U.S. networks and the PBS network (the 3+1 rule also used for cable systems). Dcspitc its supposedly favourablc position as a monopoly provider, Cancorn has had difficulty in operating profitably. The first signs of a profitable future appeared in the fourth quartcr of the 1985-86 fiscal year when the company declared a profit of SlO4.OOO.
In sum, sevcnl structural monopolies cxist in the operation of lhc satellite broadcasting sysEm. First and foremost is thc monopoly position of Tclesat and the various owncrship. invcstmcnt and channel-leasing controls that have bccn excrciscd by the fedcral government and the major tclcphone companies. Second, there is the monopoly position givcn to Cancom by thc CRTC, for thc provision of broadcasting scrvices u, undcrservcd arms. Thc economically marginal operation of Cancom until rcccndy has m a t thc company must concentrate on reducing its costs and on developing as quickly as possible the markels for its program packagcs in thc larger urban ccntrcs it is pcrmittcd to reach. Thcre has bccn littlc room for consideration of carrying unprofinblc, minority-intcrcst programming scrviccs such as those for nonhcrn native pcoplc although carriage of nativc-languagc radio programming was originally rcquircd by thc CRTC as part of the liccnsec's mandate.
The Cultural Dimension
Thc cultunl dimcnsion of thc monopolies of knowledge is an extrcmcly important part of this analysis. At its core, a cultural monopoly is the power to extend one dominant view of thc world to pcoplc previously out of rcach. Via satcllitcs, the rcach of Amcrican television programming contcnt throughout Canada is virtually complcte --evcn in thc far north. A satcllitc communications system, as now organized, is an exccllcnt exarnplc of spatial control by one centre ovcr the rest of the country. Actually, it shows two vcrsions of this control: one is the extension of control from the U.S. into the far rcachcs of Canada; the other is from certain southcm Canadian cities to the "regions", including thc north. In both versions, it involves the greater control by metropoIilan ccntres ovcr the hinterland.
Satcllitc broadcasting services carry very little new content; almost all the satellite-fed services are extension-s of existing television stations and networks or they arc re-formatted vcrsions of standard television content --movies, sports, variety entcrtainmcnt, religious programming, dramas, news and so on --into special-interest channcls. There arc some radio broadcast signals canicd too but these are a minor. part of satcllitc broadcasting to date. Thcsc are also mainly retransmissions of programming content produced in mcuopolitan centres although some native lan p a g e radio programming is distributcd on the CBC's Nonhcm Scrvice and some more is carried by Cancom. If one looks at who is in charge of creating the contcnt and program packages carricd on Canadian satcllites, these are basically: the CBC; Cancom (and indirectly some Canadian and American private broadcasters and PBS); and a fcw Canadian pay-TV and specialty service programmers. (Some Amcrican pay-TV services can also bedistributed by Canadian cable operators, under thecurrcnt CRTC policies; the signals are received from American satellites by the operators involved.) All of the programmers stick to the standard industrial practices of centralizing content production. acquisition and distributiori. Any opportunities for creating new sources of programming, purchasing new kinds of programming or designing new types of distribution nctworks have bccn almost entircly ignored since satellite broadcasting became possible in the early 1970s.
A leading examplc of a producer of tclcvision programming for nativc pcoplc is the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation (IBC), fundcd by the fcdcral govcrnmcnt sincc 1981. (In 1987, thcrc wcre scven nativc communications socictics producing TV programs for distribution in various rcgions of northcrn Canada.) Thc IBC can produce limitcd amounts of programming for distribution lo communitics in thc Easlcm Arctic whcrc nativc Language speakcrs predominate. However, those hours are a fraction of thc total tclcvision programming rcccivcd in thc same comrnunitics. Also, IBC must rcly on thc CBC, which provides satcllitc access for a fcw hours cach week, if it wants to broadcast to the widespread comrnunitics. Furthcmorc, along with the twclvc othcr native communities socictics in Canada, IBC must dcpcnd on fcdcral govcmmcnt funding to opcratc thcir organization and producc programming. The funds in qucstion now comc largcly from the Northcm Nativc Broadcast Access Program, fist cstablishcd in 1983 and which provided up to S 0 . 3 million for all nativc communications socictics ovcr four ycars (Valaskakis, 1985) . In May 1987, thc Program was establishcd on a pcrmancnt basis by thc Sccrctary of State and given a budgct of S13.2 million pcr ycar.
Thc five policy principles on which the hogram is built arc:
Northcrn rcsidcnts should be offcrcd access to an incrcasing range of programming choiccs through the exploitation of technological opportunities.
Northcrn native pcople should have the opportunity to participate actively in the determination by the CRTC of the character, quantity and priority ofprogramming broadcast in predominantly native communities.
Northcrn native people should have fair access to northcrn broadcasting distribution systems to maintain and develop their cultures and languages.
Programming relevant to native concerns, including contcnt originated by nativc pcople, should be produccd for distribution on northcrn broadcasting scrviccs wherever native people form a significant proportion of thc population in the scrvicc arca.
5. Northcrn native rcprcsentativcs should be consulted regularly by government agencics engaged in establishing broadcasting policies which would affect their cultures.
The Program is still relatively new and its effects on the production and distribution of native language programming for radio and television are oftcn limited to thc local lcvcl so far. The longer term effects on the broadcasting services available to nativc pcoplc in h e north rcmain uncertain, espccidly if they cannot gain better acccss to the satellite-fed scrvices that predominate in the region.
The CBC has also had a major role to play in northern Canada in providing broadcasting scrvices that are somcthing other than a strict extension of southern nctworks and Amcrican programming. Following the dcvelopmcnt of the Accclcrated Covcmgc Plan in thc mid-1970s, additional pressure was placed on the CBC to do morc than simply cxtcnd southcrn programming farthcr and farther into thc north. The cxpcricncc with CBC's radio scrvices in the north has bccn gcnerally good (although not all native cornmunitics arc satisfied) but thcrc havc bccn large difficulties with the tclcvision scrvicc providcd. The Northcrn Servicc in CBC Radio has bccn dcvcloped on a sub-rcgional basis in the tcrritorics, has become increasingly available in the northcrn arcas of many provinces. and has achieved a rathcr successful blend of local (somctimcs community-access), sub-regional, northern and national network programming for its listeners across the north. This has bccn possible through a combination of factors: thc relatively low cost of installing and operating a local radio bansmittcr with small studio attached; thc narrow bandwidth rcquircd for radio signal bansmission (via satellite or othcr mcthods): the flexibility of network arrangements to allow programming to originate from different centrcs at diffcrcnt times of day; the rclative ease with which pcoplc can be trained to produce radio programs; and the use of various languages in northern programming so as to reach most of the northern audicncc with some programmes each day.
Tclcvision has been altogether diffcrcnt in its dcvclopment. Since 1973, the CBC's television scrvicc to the north has i s n the subject of much criticism from its audicncc. The first major opportunity for the expression of public dissatisfaction was the CRTC hearing on CBC network licence rcncwals in 1974, when the two main complaints wcre of a disorganized schedule of programming and the irrelevance of much of what was broadcast (CRTC, 1974: 62-63) . The latter criticism was a special problcm for native people, many of whom did not understand English very well, and whosc life cxpcricnce was no preparation for seeing programs about urban problems and action-packed American fiction. By 1979, the next CRTC hearing on CBC's liccnccs, the situation had not improved much for the Northern Television service (CRTC, 1979: 25-29) . At special hearings held in northern communities, the CRTC h& eighty-seven representations, most of them concerned about the irrelevance and inmsiveness of southern programming beamed to their area. Even the CBC officials at the hearings were ready to agree that the television service was unsuitable but their problem was lack of funds to produce appropriate content for the small audience of northem viewers.
While native people have objected to the television service as irrelevant or culturally threatening, their hope is for a more relevant service using northern program producers. However, most northern residents who are not native people tend to have criticisms that are rather different For them the CBC's Northern Television service is unacceptable when it is the only channel available; they want more TV channels and preferably the same range of choice as the Canadians in southern cities receive. Cultural thrcats are less of a concern than is the isolation from television services they know other Canadians can see. Given these differences between native and non-native preferences in satellite television, and given the enormous costs attached to creating special scrviccs for the small northern population, the use of satellites for broadcasting in the north is fraught with difficulties if anyone tries to respond to the audience's cultural needs. The CBC has tried to respond but has consistently pointed out, to the CRTC and others. that the necessary funds have not been provided by Parliament. It may be that thc Northern Native Broadcast Access Program of the Secretary of State can, in the longer run and if adequately funded, provide the basis for a fully northern television scrvice. The programming is gradually being produced but the difficulties of gaining access to the satellite distribution systems are only just beginning.
Conclusions
The approach of looking at satellite broadcasting in terms of the monopolies of knowledge that may exist can be useful in pinpointing where the constraints are in the technological system. These constraints are much less likely to be technical barriers but rather are political and economic structures and rules established by governments and businesses for their own reasons.
If we are trying to understand why there is the present flow pattern of broadcasting content via the Canadian satellite system, we find first of all that satellite research and development in Canada has been a joint effort by the federal government and the aerospace industry. Second, the Parliamentary mandate of Telesat Canada as well as its ownership, investment sources and channel-leasing practices all ensure that the cultural dimension of broadcast service extension is not considered by the satellite Corporation. Also, Cancom must concentrate on the satellite delivery of broadcasting signals that will make the company profitable; the cultural implications of the increased spread of southern television and radio signals to the north cannot be its major concern.
Third, while Parliament has required the CBC to extend its broadcasting services to as many Canadian communities as possible, there has not been the funding to produce new and relevant kinds of programs for the northern native audience that has been reached. More recently, the federal government's Northern Native Broadcast Access hogram has tried to respond to this lack by supporting just over a dozen native communications societies in radio and television program production but the distribution access remains elusive.
It might be argued that the introduction of Direct Broadcast Satellites @BS) within the next few year is likely to create a less controlled satellite broadcasting system. While DBS appears to offer new opportunities for satellite dish owners and content packagers, what is likely to change is merely the ability of more householders to receive satellite signals directly rather than through a cable system or over-air transmitter. In Canada, the physical ownership of satellites will remain wilh Telesat while the economic and political constraints on satellite design and usage that are now exercised by government and business will remain essentially unchanged.
